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Abstract
This paper presents the design of an autonomous mobile
platform and its security system. The MB835 mobile platform
has been adopted for RoboX, a fully autonomous tour guide
robot. In 2002, 11 of these tour guides have served the Ro-
botics exhibition at Expo.02 (Swiss National Exhibition)
from May 15 to October 20. This project has been conjointly
conducted by the Autonomous Systems Lab, Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL) and BlueBotics SA
the spin-off company of the lab, which has produced the ro-
bots. The goal was to maximize the autonomy and mobility of
the platform while ensuring high performance, robustness
and security. The paper presents the platform, its navigation
and security, which resulted in the ANT product (Autono-
mous Navigation Technology) and the results of the Robotics
exhibition as empirical validation of the whole system.
1. Introduction
Today’s solution for the industry, the so called autonomous
guided vehicles (AGVs), usually employ expensive and in-
flexible environment modifications for their navigation such
as inductive wires in the floor or reflectors as beacons, which
obligate the machine to stay on the trajectory defined a prio-
ry. Any exception due to the assumption that the environ-
ment is static and the trajectory free, result in situations,
where human assistance is needed.
Nowadays, autonomous robot navigation approaches are
ready for unmodified environments and flexible motion.
However, until now, these approaches have not leaved the re-
search labs, but for very rare occasions. When leaving the
lab, even if the environment is known and accessible, a gen-
eral approach requiring no environmental changes remains
better suited for real-world and industrial purposes. For the
same reason, a fully-autonomous and self-contained robot is
preferable. Furthermore, outside the research world, such a
machine is required to have a long live cycle and a high mean
time between failure (MTBF), which minimizes the need of
human supervision, remain efficient and cost effective.
A limited number of researchers have demonstrated auton-
omous navigation in exhibitions or museums [6], [12], [15],
[7] and [14]. Furthermore, most of these systems have still
some limitations in their navigation approaches. For instance
Rhino [6] and Minerva [15] have shown their strengths in
museums for one week, 19 kilometers and two weeks, 44 ki-
lometers respectively. However, their navigation has two
major drawbacks: it relies on off-board resources, and due to
the use of raw range data for localization and mapping it is
sensible to environmental dynamics. Sage [12], Chips, Swee-
tlips, Joe and Adam [14], use a completely different approach
for permanent installations in museums: the environment is
changed by adding artificial landmarks to localize the robot.
This approach performed well, as shown with a total of more
than half a year of operation and 323 kilometers for Sage [12]
and a total of more than 3 years and 600 kilometers for Chips,
Sweetlips, Joe and Adam [14]. However their movements,
but for Adam, are limited to a predefined set of unidirectional
safe routes in order to simplify both localization and path-
planning. Another robot permanent installation which is op-
erating since March 2000, is presented in [7]. Three self-con-
tained mobile robots navigate in a restricted and very well
structured area. Localization uses segment features and a
heuristic scheme for matching and pose estimation. Another
exhibition where Pygmalion, a fully autonomous self-con-
tained robot was accessible on the web during one week [1]
has shown its positive characteristics but, due to the unimo-
dal characteristic of the used Extended Kalman Filter, the ro-
bot can still lose track if unmodeled events take place.
This paper presents the design of an autonomous mobile
platform and its security system. Then the Robotics exhibi-
tion will be presented with its results for more than 13’000
hours of operation and more than 3’300 km.
In 2002, from May 14 to October 20, the Expo.02 - Swiss
National Exhibition - took place on four places around the
three lake region. The Robotics exhibition took place in Neu-
châtel, where the main thematic was nature and artifice. Ro-
botics was intended to show the increasing proximity
between man and machine. The visitors interacted with up to
11 autonomous, freely navigating tour guide robots, which
present the exhibit going from industrial robotics to cyborgs
on a surface of 320 m2.
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2. Design
The MB835 platform has been designed for environments
crowded with people and other dynamic and static objects.
This requires the following characteristics for the mobile
platform:
• Highly reliable and fully autonomous navigation in
unmodified environments crowded of humans.
• Safety for humans, objects, and the robot itself all the
time.
• Minimal human intervention and simple supervision.
This has been achieved with the following design.
The navigation platform consists mainly in a CompactPCI
rack, two laser range sensors (SICKs LMS-200), the batter-
ies, eight bumpers and the differential drive actuators with
Harmonic Drive gears. The base (figure 1) has an octagonal
shape with two actuated wheels on a central axis and two
castor wheels. In order to guarantee good ground contact of
the drive wheels, one of the castor wheels is mounted on a
spring suspension. This gives an excellent manoeuvrability
and stability for hardware extensions as the 1.65 m high
RoboX.
The control system has been designed very carefully by
keeping in mind that the safety of the humans and the plat-
form has to be guaranteed all the time. It is composed of a
CompactPCI rack containing a Motorola PowerPC 750 card,
which can be extended with an Intel Pentium III card as for
the control of the interaction turret of the RoboX. The Pow-
erPC card is connected by the PCI backplane to an analog/
digital I/O card, a Bt848-based frame grabber, an encoder IP
module and a high bandwidth RS-422 IP module. Further-
more a Microchip PIC processor is used as redundant secu-
rity system for the PowerPC card.
The result of the design is the MB835 platform: A mobile
vehicle ready for the real world (figure 1).
3. Navigation
Even though the presentation of the navigation is not the
main goal of this work, it is briefly described in this section
as introduction to the next one: Security. This is indispens-
able to better understand the security requirements of the
system.
The section divides the navigation task in three parts:
• Map
• Planning and Motion
• Localization
This approaches, in combination with the security, build
ANT - Autonomous Navigation Technology, as it is de-
scribed in figure 2.
3.1 Map
The map of the environment is a graph-like structure with
nodes representing  positions the robot has to reach
in order to perform a certain task. This graph is therefore
used for path-planning. Furthermore it contains the informa-
tion about all the features in the environment. This permits
to calculate which feature is visible from the current position
of the robot and to use it for localization.
3.2 Path Planning and Motion
ANT implements three path planning algorithms. They
work on different levels of abstraction and take sensor read-
ings into account in varying degrees. The topmost layer is
the graph-based global planner. It is based on the above men-
tioned graph structure where nodes are locations of interest
(e.g. a showcase, a docking station) and edges denote tra-
versability between locations. The planner employs a depth-
first search and generates a length-optimal path. Since the
path is global and no sensor readings are taken into account,
dynamic path modification cannot be treated on this level.
The second layer of path planning uses the NF1 navigation










































Figure 2: ANT, the Autonomous Navigation Technology is
a BlueBotics product, which allows transforming any vehi-
cle into an autonomous navigating system.
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into account the current sensor readings and is not limited to
nodes of the a-priori map. However, the paths generated by
NF1 have a very poor geometry, consisting of linear seg-
ments that lie on angles which are multiples of 45°. Another
disadvantage is their tendency to graze obstacles.
Smoothing the path and adapting it to dynamic surround-
ings is done in the third layer of path planning. It is based on
the elastic band [15]. The initial plan, generated by the NF1,
evolves toward a smoother curve (a list of via points) as long
as the elastic band does not "snap". In case dynamic obsta-
cles move in such a way that the minimum clearance along
the path cannot be maintained, or if the path lengthens be-
yond a reasonable amount, the NF1 is called upon again to
re-initialize the path.
The motion is under control of the real-time obstacle
avoidance task, which is based on the dynamic window
method [7]. Using the dynamic window allows to:
• Take into account the actuator limits of the robot (speed
which could result in later collisions are not allowed,
motion commands never exceed the robot's speed or
acceleration limits).
• Take into account the "exact" robot shape as represented
by a convex polygon (extension to any polygon can be
done by decomposition).
In comparison to the original dynamic window publica-
tions [7], two adaptations have been made:
• Instead of using the distance travelled before hitting an
obstacle, the time until collision is used. This solves a
singularity when the robot is turning on the spot (any
collisions would seem instantaneous because the dis-
tance travelled seems zero). It also means the robot will
choose more clearance when travelling at higher speeds.
• The objective functions for speed, heading, and clear-
ance are calculated on the actuator phase space 
instead of the usual . Actuator limits are thus
more directly taken into account.
The dynamic window task is executed with a frequency of
10Hz. It is part of the time- and security-critical processes of
the navigation technology. Special attention has therefore
been paid to optimize its execution time, which should be
short and predictable. Both issues are addressed by the use
of look-up-tables [16]: Their fixed size give an upper bound
to the number of operations, and the intensive calculations
(intersecting circles with line segments) can be done once at
the initialization step. Adopting look-up-tables means large
memory usage, especially when storing floating point val-
ues. This problem has been addressed by compressing the ta-
bles, using a Lloyd-Max quantizer. The compression is
handled transparently, a fact that was facilitated by the ob-
ject oriented design philosophy underlying our navigation
software.
3.3 Localization
While autonomous guided vehicles (AGVs) usually em-
ploy for their navigation expensive and inflexible environ-
ment modifications such as floor tracks or reflectors as
beacons, nowadays localization approaches are ready for un-
modified environments, i.e. natural features.
The localization system is inspired by the experience from
earlier work [1] gathered over a five year period and more
than hundred kilometers travelled distance. It adds features
from the localization system presented in [2]. This method is
a global feature-based multi-hypothesis localization using
the Kalman filter as estimation framework. It overcomes
limitations of the single-hypothesis Kalman filter [7], since
the data association problem is explicitly addressed. The ro-
bot preserves the typical advantages of feature-based ap-
proaches, such as very high localization accuracy and an
efficient implementation and adds an important feature in
the case the robot looses the track of its position: It can gen-
erates hypotheses about its current position and therefore re-
locate itself.
The technique which provides this property is a con-
strained-based search in an interpretation tree [10], [2]. This
tree is spanned by all possible local-to-global associations,
given a local map of observed features and a global map of
model features. The same search is consistently employed
for hypothesis generation and pose tracking.
4. Security
This section presents the security system, which guaran-
tees the safety of humans, objects, and the robot itself.
All the software which relates to the movement of the ro-
bot is defined as safety critical. The safety is on three levels:
The operating system, the software implementation and the
redundancy of the hardware. The operating system is pre-
sented by focusing on the approaches, which have been
adopted in order to make it as ergonomic as possible for the
development of complex mechatronics applications. The
other two sections are related to the concrete implementation
of the ANT product on the MB835 mobile base.
4.1 Operating System: XO/2 
XO/2 is an object-oriented, hard-real time system software
and framework, designed for safety, extensibility and ab-
straction [5]. It is written in, and designed for the object-ori-
ented language Oberon-2 [12]. It takes care of many
common issues faced by programmers of mechatronic prod-
ucts, by hiding general design patterns inside internal mech-
anisms or by encapsulating them into easy-to-understand
abstractions. The criterion by which the system has been
crafted has been the careful handling of the safety aspects.
These mechanisms, pervasive yet efficient, allow the system
to maintain a deus ex-machina knowledge about the running
applications, thus providing higher confidence to the appli-
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cation programmer. The latter, relieved from many comput-
er-science aspects, can better focus his attention to the actual
problem to be solved. 
Safety, as commonly used, is a rather general notion of
“the system does what it should, and does not what it should
not”. However, in order to analyze in greater detail how safe-
ty can actually be achieved and supported, a more formal
separation of what is perceived as “safety” is required.
Szyperski [17] separated safety in the more technical terms
of safety, progress, and security. These terms can be summa-
rized as follows: Nothing bad happens, the right things do
(eventually) happen, and things happen under proper autho-
rization (or potentially bad things happen under proper su-
pervision). All three interact to make a system safe in
broader sense. 
Safety can be enforced statically or dynamically. In some
cases it is in fact possible to statically detect safety violations
(or security or progress) by means of (simple) formal verifi-
cation performed off-line. In other cases, safety needs to be
enforced through supervised execution: If something poten-
tially unsafe is detected, execution is stopped and proper
countermeasures are taken. XO/2 addresses safety concerns
through the deployment of several distinct mechanisms. 
Memory safety is solved with the effort of both the pro-
gramming language, which takes care of the static type-safe-
ty and a run-time enforcement system, which supervises
memory accesses while isolating spurious fetches through
run-time mechanisms, such as the light-weight sandboxing
approach, described in [4] or the automatic real-time com-
patible garbage collector presented in [3].
Progress is handled by an earliest deadline driven schedul-
er (EDF), which allows the application programmer to spec-
ify the task’s execution priority by means of its timing
constraints, i.e. its duration, its deadline and its period. The
scheduler tests new tasks for admission in the task set upon
task creation, while continuously monitoring the application
run-time for constraints violations. 
4.2 Software Security
Tasks whose failure could cause injuries to people or dam-
age objects required special attention during design. Build
on top of the XO/2 operating system the security critical
software has been designed to ensure that failures will be un-
der complete control of the security controller, a real-time
task running at 50Hz.
This task has the control over the amplifiers and can there-
fore block the robot if a critical exception takes place. It
senses the speed controller and the obstacle avoidance by
means of watchdogs and reads the inputs from the bumpers.
Failure of one of these tasks is detected by the security con-
troller which then either restarts the failed task or stops the
robot and sends an e-mail to the maintenance.This permit to
centralize the control of the security and to ask to a single ob-
ject if a defect is disturbing the system.
Furthermore, the security controller generates signals for
the redundant security processor. On one side it sends a
watchdog signal on a digital output permitting to know if
both the operating system and the security controller are still
running, on the other, it acknowledges the detection and
treatment of bumpers signals to the same processor.
4.3 Hardware Redundancy
In order to be robust against hardware failures, the plat-
form has a second processor: A Microchip PIC. Its task is
firstly to check the emergency button, the watchdog and a
part of motor's amplifiers before enabling the motors. Fur-
thermore, the software running on it checks the watchdog
generated by the security controller, controls that the pre-de-
fined maximal speed is never exceeded, awaits acknowl-
edgements from the security for each bumper contact and
ensures that the bumper’s switch circuit is properly connect-
ed. If one of these conditions is not respected, the redundant
security software on the PIC safely stops the robot (it short-
cuts the phases of the motors) and puts it in emergency mode
(acoustic alarm). This state is detected by the PowerPC (if it
is not the cause of the failure), which will then send an email
to the maintenance. The PIC also shows the kind of error
with a row of LEDs and stores each error for statistics.
5. Experimental Results
The whole operational period of the Robotics exhibition at
Expo.02, is available for statistics. This makes a total of 159
days, from May 14 to October 20, 2002. During this period,
each day (9:30am-8:00pm till August, 9:00am-8:00pm in
September, 9:00am-9:00pm in October) six to eleven freely
navigating tour-guide robots have given tours on the exhibi-
tion’s surface which is approximately 320 m2.
5.1 Definitions
Failure: A failure is any kind of problem which requires hu-
man intervention. The only exceptions are the emergency
button, which can be pressed and released also by visitors,
and the situations where the robot remains blocked because
it is to near too an object. In the latter case, the staff can eas-
ily displace the 115 kilograms robot by means of a switch
disconnecting the motors from the amplifiers.
Uncritical: Uncritical failures are those which do not stop
the task of the robot. For example, a failure consisting in a
robot which stops sending an image to the supervisor is not
critical for the tour the robot is giving to the visitors.
Critical: Critical failures stop the robot until human inter-
vention is performed. An example is the failure of the sce-
nario controller or of the obstacle avoidance.
Reboot: Critical failures requiring a reboot of the PowerPC
are treated separately because they require more time before
the robot is again operational.
5.2 Results
During the 159 days of operation the robots served more
than 680’000 visitors for a total of 13’313 hours of opera-
tional time. In order to perform their job, they travelled
3’316 kilometers for a total moving time of more than 9’415
hours meaning that the mean displacement speed is 0.098
meters per second. As it can be seen in table 1, the uncritical
failures represent 23.8% of the total amount of failures.
However, they do not disturb the operation of the robot.
They are therefore not treated in the following analysis
which will focus on the critical and reboot failures. Further-
more, this work presents the results from the navigation plat-
form only, not of the interaction turret, which had also a
complex software. More details about the latter topic can be
found in [19].
In figure 3 all the critical failures coming from the naviga-
tion software (PowerPC) are shown. During the first three
weeks, errors in the safety-critical tasks were treated by the
security controller, but could sometimes require a reboot in
order to restart the trapped task. This has been partly correct-
ed allowing for much faster intervention in case of failure.
Critical failures in figure 3 count errors which have not di-
rectly to do with the software: Failures of the localization
system (504 meaning 72.6% of the 694 critical failures of the
PowerPC) also requires human intervention. It turned out
that the vast majority of the failures in the localization soft-
ware were due to visitors or untrained personnel, who fid-
dled with the robots without disconnecting the motors from
the amplifiers. This caused large errors in the odometry not
taken into account in the models and, consequently, failures
in the localization1. This explains the holes in the MTBF
chart of figure 4.
The MTBF for the PowerPC (figure 4 (a)) was between 20
and 80 hours already at the beginning of the exposition. By
taking into account only the software errors (figure 4 (b)),
the MTBF over the whole period is 70.1 hours.
Hardware failures (figure 5) are due to some uncritical de-
sign errors at the beginning (robot doors), some motor-am-
plifier problems and the temperature, which was up to 35°C
in the exhibit and therefore up to 90°C near the rack, be-
tween day 33 and day 40 causing some component failures.
Run time 13’313 h
Movement time 9’415 h
Travelled distance 3’316 km
Speed (average / max) 0.098 / 0.6 m/s
Failures (total / critical / uncritical) 1141 / 870 / 271
Critical failures (PowerPC / HW) 694 / 176
Critical PowerPC (software / lost) 190 / 504
Visitors 686’405
Table 1: Five months of operation. More than 13’000
hours of work, where the RoboXes have travelled 3’300
kilometers and served more than 680’000 visitors.
Figure 3: The critical failures of the PowerPC (navigation
system). Some of the critical errors require the reboot of
the PowerPC. Lost failures are not software errors but fail-
ure of the localization approach due to human misuse.
1. The failures in the localization system are often
called lost situations.
Figure 4: The MTBF (critical) with (a) and without (b) lost
situations. By not taking into account the lost situations (b)
the MTBF is very high (mean 70.1 hours).
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Hardware problems also cause critical failures.
5.3 Lessons to be Learned
The characteristics of this project give an extraordinary
chance of learning by experience. Thousands of hours of op-
eration permit improving the software and hardware to a lev-
el which is simply not achievable with smaller projects. This
was shown during the exploitation, where some errors were
found after few days of operation while others appeared for
the first time after one or two months. For instance, the peaks
of failures in figure 3 allowed to understand that the majority
of the localization errors are due to bad human manipula-
tions of the robot. This has been discovered around day 50
by seeing a new member of the staff fiddling with the robots
without disconnecting the motors from the amplifiers. How-
ever, the best example of this long term learning process are
the failures of the laser scanners on week 5 due to the tem-
perature in the exhibit. This failure wasn’t taken into account
by the security causing the obstacle avoidance to permanent-
ly receive the last available scan and the robot to collide with
the next encountered object. This problem is since then un-
der supervision of the security controller.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, the design of the MB835 platform has been
presented with its the navigation and security approach. This
approach constitutes the ANT - Autonomous Navigation
Technology - product. In sections 2 through 4, it is shown
how a coherent design starting from the mechanics through
the electronics and finally the software, permits creating a
machine, which is compatible with the real-world under the
requirements of performance, robustness and security. The
security issue is specifically faced with the aim of ensuring
the security to the humans, the environment, the objects and
the robot itself.
The experimental section presents the Robotics project.
There, the MB835 base has been employed with an interac-
tion turret to create a tour guide robot named RoboX. This
project represents a milestone in the field of mobile robotics:
For the first time 11 interactive mobile robots are produced
and used for a long time (five months) as real products in-
stead of prototypes as in former projects. The results of the
whole project (159 days of operation) of the Robotics exhi-
bition are presented into details for the mobile platform and
its software. The analysis focuses on the amount and type of
robot failures and shows the reliability and robustness of
both the hardware and software.
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